No Rupture Here

The most popular narratives of the current political moment from liberals and Leftists alike is that there was a decisive political rupture between November and January where the liberal order was replaced by a fascist one; perhaps in the election, perhaps in the inauguration. As winter has shifted into spring, spring into summer, and summer into autumn, however, this narrative does not seem to hold up. In particular, though open fascists have gained a larger audience, defenders from the liberal press, and greater boldness, the policies of the new administration seem largely a continuation of, rather than a rupture with, long-standing trends, something which is either omitted or occluded in most liberal narratives. This does not mean its policies are nice and soft, but rather that the policies of the new administration frequently cited as ‘fascist’ have clear antecedents in existing policies (the previous president, for instance, had deserved his nickname of “deporter-in-chief” and had bombed 7 countries; in addition, the militarization of police and the growth of the prison-industrial complex did not slow down in the previous administration, nor did the use of torture cease), some of which were written and defended by people now celebrated as “leaders” of the so-called “resistance”, such as David Frum. Additionally, the new administration has proved remarkably incompetent at taking hold of the state apparatus–its primary way of doing so appears to be through the judicial branch, not the executive branch–and despite controlling both houses of congress, the new administration appears to feud almost as often with congress as the previous administration did.

Either, then, we have “fascists without fascism”, or America has been fascist for far longer than we are willing to admit. In order to decide which is the case, we must have a clearer understanding of what fascism is and what it is not.

Permanent Loyal Opposition

Yesterday, the Democrats lost the most expensive House of Representatives election in history–a special election for Georgia’s 6th district (Cook PVI R+8). Georgia’s 6th district consists of the conservative suburbs of Atlanta; it is largely made of upper-middle-class suburban right-wing white people. The Democrats backed candidate Jon Ossoff heavily, gathering $23.6 million in aggressively-solicited donations and $7.6 million from groups including the party’s purse (for a total of $31.2 million); he ran on a right-wing platform of (in the words of no less an elite institution than the New York Times) “economic development and fiscal restraint”. Ossoff lost to the Republican, Karen Handel, who had raised $4.5 million in donations and received $18.2 million from groups including the party’s purse (for a total of $22.7 million), by a 4-point margin. [1] There were three other special elections between a Republican and a Democrat in 2017 that have completed, all of which the Democrats have lost: one in Montana’s at-large district (the Democrat was Rob Quist), one in Kansas’s 4th district (the Democrat was James Thompson), and one in South Carolina’s 5th district (the Democrat was Archie Parnell). None of these elections received any fundraising attention or financial support from the DNC; all were run in traditionally heavily Republican seats (Cook PVIs being R+11, R+15, and R+9, respectively)–yet despite this, they achieved single-digit margins: 6 points, 7 points, and 3 points. Quist and Parnell both ran on a platform which, though still thoroughly liberal, was relatively to the left of Ossoff (indeed, despite Parnell’s ties to Goldman Sachs)–and one could even make the same case for Thompson, though perhaps with less strength. Quist in particular ran a remarkably progressive campaign for the US, endorsing single-payer healthcare, progressive taxation, an end to the drug war, dropping military spending, and pay equity and reproductive rights for women.  One must ask the following question if one thinks at all: why did the Democrats pour so much money into an uninspired right-wing candidate when faced with such golden opportunities–who they didn’t fund at all?

When one considers the political context–that of a Democratic establishment seeking to crush all leftward internal dissension–the motivation becomes clearer. The establishment’s line has historically been that yes, they agree with their base, but they must be pragmatic and win elections (even though they’re doing neither, and recently have started openly attacking their base’s preferred policies) by appealing to the supposedly massive demographic of upper-middle-class white home-owning right-wing suburbanites who, according to their narrative, decide everything. It has been clear for two years now that the Democrat formula of pandering to this mythical demographic has failed, yet the Democrats have, if anything, hardened their right-wing position–bitterly attacking their left flank and refusing funds, as noted above, to candidates who wish to take a different tack, even if the opportunities for electoral success are much brighter than the avenues chosen by the establishment. Behind the bleating that “there is no alternative” we see once more the hidden hand of ideology, yet no longer can this charm millions. I suspect that the Democrats are on their way to becoming what I call a permanent loyal opposition, like the Democratic Party of Japan or the Communist Party and Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation–any pretense of pragmatic shifts to win elections is gone.

When I use the term “loyal opposition” here, I’m not referring to the compound noun used in British politics to refer to the chief opposition party (the meaning there being that the opposition can oppose policies but defer to the state), but rather to denote that the opposition is loyal to the policies it claims to oppose, not merely the state that enacts them. It only seeks to undermine the dominant party to the extent that this could add to its legitimacy among its base–and then, only in appearance, almost never in substance, if at all possible. Like all parties, a permanent loyal opposition functions largely to control the political expression of its base rather than to reflect it in policy. What makes the permanent loyal opposition different is that it no longer seriously attempts to take power; it exists solely to make dominant-party rule unchallengeable (and thus acceptable, if not palatable) while retaining formal democracy. All other functions have been sacrificed for the main function of suppressing dissent and manufacturing consent.

This formation is also closely related to the constriction of non-electoral political action; the permanent loyal opposition wishes that all non-electoral political action take two forms: the rally (though it may be disguised as a protest march or a strike, the simple fact that it generally does not constrict capital or make any real demands means that it is merely a rally) and contacting legal representatives. These two forms are, of course, favored precisely because they are useless in forcing action in accordance with the wishes of their participants but are useful in building the legitimacy of the permanent loyal opposition. Consider also the ever-expanding definition of violence in reference to deeds of the people (as opposed to deeds of the State and its armed representatives, which are never considered illegitimate or violent)–first, harm against people, then, harm against property, now, simply being at a rally.

That the Democratic Party serves mainly as a vehicle to manage its base’s political expression and not as a vehicle to express the base’s ambitions in policy is not new; what is new is the possibility that it may be done almost entirely from opposition. Indeed, the former notion in a more general form is not a new theory; elements of it were recognized by Leftists as far back as the 19th century, and it was expressed as a theory by Antonio Gramsci (and later by Nicos Poulantzas, among others) in the mid-20th century. I hope it is more obvious now that the masks of consent have begun to slip, revealing the fists of force.


[1] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/20/us/politics/georgia-6th-most-expensive-house-election.html

Don’t Swallow the Bait

Recently, with the electoral victory of its candidate, the alt-right has come to prominence. One of the ways it has managed to remain in the public eye is by claiming to be not only a subculture but the subculture of contemporary times, and in so doing lay claim to all sorts of elements of other subcultures and to the past of the avant-garde as their own. Let me, for the space of this article, shelve the important discussion about the ways in which the contemporary Left has become docile, artistically, and how liberals have emptied left-wing rhetoric: Red Wedge has an article on that. Instead, this article will attempt to explain how to respond.

The alt-right uses this to recuperate many pieces of left-wing culture, though rarely with the success that is often attributed to them. The Matrix, a film by two trans women, has been so used, as have They Live!V for Vendetta (which in the comic book original is quite literally a confrontation between an anarchist protagonist and a fascist antagonist), and, recently, Depeche Mode (with the band members, who’d just released a very left-wing music video, telling Richard Spencer to fuck off in response). None of these have been fully successful, but pretending like they have only aids them. This is an attempt to neutralise the left-wing message and force the Left to abandon its rhetoric and aesthetics and settle for the more standard pablum æsthetics. It’s also been used against less politically-charged parts of mass culture, such as memes: take, for example, the right-wing takeover of Pepe, or the more recent (and less successful) attempt at taking over Trash Dove.

The worst way of approaching it is, true to form, the way in which most people have approached it. Generally, when the alt-right wishes to claim a symbol or other cultural artifact, they broadcast their intentions in a way that is meant to appear secret but is in fact meant to be discovered by outside media. Said media then freak out: soon come out, fresh off the presses, tens of articles showing how this symbol or media was always problematic (the favorite adjective) or might have been good but is now irrevocably tainted, written by underpaid college graduates. The tone is generally one of loss or anger.

This serves the alt-right by doing their work for them. The notion that they are subversive outsiders (when at this point they’re foot-soldiers) is reinforced, and the liberals, left-liberals, and the Left abandons this æsthetics, to retreat to a mass-produced, inoffensive, pablum mainstream. This, again, reinforces the notion that the Left has no new ideas and is hegemonic, instead of reflecting the marginal position in which it is.

What do we do instead? Fight back! Don’t just jump on the outrage machine and retreat, but instead make it impossible for the right-wing to actually claim these artifacts as their own. Emphasize their Left-wing message instead of tidying them up for liberal consumption. Relegate the noise that the right-wing produces to a mere curiosity.

On Automation and the Contradictions of Capital

Since the Industrial Revolution at least, but especially in the wake of post-industrial computerization, labor and technology have often been set against one another. Capitalism uses labor and technology as substitutes, and capitalists often use replacement-by-technology as a threat to the ambitions of labor. When labor fights back, capitalists present them as backwards obstacles to “progress”, which is rhetorically the progress of technology, but really the progress of the pursuit of profits. Indeed, this is the source of our word “Luddite”, where laborers, lead by the mythical Ned Ludd, would destroy the machines which were replacing them. The capitalist press was unable to comprehend why laborers would destroy those symbols of progress, and came to use “Luddite” to refer to an irrational hatred of technology. However, though a hatred of technology itself might certainly have been part of the early Luddite movement, the real center of their anger was economic. The Luddites were skilled artisans who were being replaced by machines operated by low-skilled workers, and had destroyed machinery to protest against this loss of livelihood and gain a better bargaining position with employers.

In our contemporary neo-liberal moment, we see similar antagonisms. Besides the offshoring of manufacturing, take, for example, the “sharing economy” and “gig economy”, which are designed to circumvent labor protections and shift costs of production from the owners to the workers. Liberals are unable to see the downsides of this, or, at best, consider them a necessary evil for the march of “progress”.

Sometimes, these tensions are further displaced, away from the capitalist system, its organization, and technology, on to hate for the new, low-paid, workers who replace the previous workers. This is the forge from which racism, and thus fascism, is built.

But it doesn’t have to be this way.

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Leftists (and indeed, even some liberals in the mid-20th century, such as John Maynard Keynes) have envisioned a world where technology and labor would move hand in hand, where automating a job away would allow for fewer work hours and indeed jobless people who, however, could live fulfilling lives and not be impoverished. If a machine could provide for the needs of 100 people, why not?

Perhaps the most evocative image of this vision was Project Cybersyn, a computer system designed in Chile during the presidency of Salvador Allende, a democratically-elected socialist who was far more committed to a genuinely Leftist vision than the social-democratic parties of Europe and North America at the time. Cybersyn was designed to provide easy access to data that could be used to adjust the economic plan and predict future economic results, and to increase worker participation in economic-decision making. Here, a cybernetic system was designed to propel labor, not to crush it. Unfortunately, Cybersyn was destroyed after the US-backed coup d’état of September 11, 1973, when Allende was ousted by Augusto Pinochet, who would rule over the country as a fascist dictator for 17 years, advised by Milton Friedman.

Indeed, from the late 1970s onwards, this vision was undermined and killed in general, partially by a resurgence of the Protestant work ethic (which was racialised: see the myth of the “welfare queen”, which relies on anti-black misogyny): that one’s worth was a consequence of selling one’s labor-power, as well as the valorization of discipline and frugality, and partially by the destruction of the apparatus which had promised to form a base for the achievement of this vision: the post-war social-democratic welfare-state. Why?

The vision of a happy marriage between automation and labor relies on the abolition of the primacy of wage labor. Indeed, one could say that the two go hand in hand. For if wage labor is still the prime way for people to achieve sustenance, then automation, which decreases the demand for labor, can do nothing but hurt labor. But the primacy of wage labor is a pillar of capitalism.

The killing of this vision was a part of the neoliberal counter-revolution. The social-democratic welfare-state had produced a problem for capital accumulation in the 1970s. Not only that, but in the wake of the aborted revolutions of 1968, even the established Left and liberals were moving leftwards: take, for example, the Löntagarfonderna, or Worker’s Fund, a proposal in the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) council to slowly buy out the owners of corporations by creating a rule in which new stock shares were distributed to workers. As a response, capital sought to destroy barriers to capital accumulation and to accumulate more capital through dispossession–things that, if done in earlier times, would be considered primitive accumulation. As a part of this process, attempts to reduce the primacy of wage labor were destroyed. Again, take the myth of the “welfare queen”, which would eventually contribute to PRWORA, the 1996 act which “destroyed welfare as we know it”. In order to legitimate this rightward turn, it was necessary to assert, in the words of Margaret Thatcher, that “there is no alternative”. This would be impossible to accomplish without the consent of the “left” parties, and indeed, by the late 1980s, this was accomplished.

Of course, it wasn’t quite accurate that all alternatives were extinguished. Chauvinist liberalism (what’s often called “conservatism” or “social conservatism”), the egg from which fascism would hatch, was kept alive, and indeed, often promoted. This was for two reasons. The first reason is that chauvinism provided an easy scapegoat for the problems capital causes. It’s all too easy to blame the loss of prosperity in the Rust Belt on migrants and not on the structures of capitalism as a whole. The second reason is that chauvinism provided an effective contrast for neoliberal cosmopolitanism. Whenever an election was held, the liberals had effectively held the vulnerable elements of their coalition at gunpoint: what can you do other than submit? Will you support the chauvinists? This contrast gave the appearance of choice, masking the fundamental lack of choice in the system. We aren’t allowed to choose anything except the neoliberal cosmopolitan agenda, which is framed as a positive choice against chauvinism as opposed to the coercion that it really is.

We’ve seen how this story ends: eventually, people are so disgusted by their disenfranchisement that they refuse to vote. Chauvinism appeals to others who are willing to scapegoat minorities when the alternative is a narrative of inevitable decline caused by technology and the economy. We must thus refuse liberalism, and its constriction of the political imagination. But this will not be easy. Despite their recent defeat, the liberals are regrouping and once again firing left, working to extinguish the political formations outside of the center and Right, and working to extinguish the political imagination outside of liberalism. In order to eventually move further, we must not cede any more ground to them, and thus must refuse to be led under their banner.

A better world awaits, but only if we allow ourselves to imagine it, and have the courage to fight for it.

 

A Curious Recurrence

One of the most famous dates in the modern era is the 18 Brumaire, the day of the year VIII (1799-1800 in our calendar) when Napoléon overthrew the Directory in favor of the Consulate, the precursor to the First French Empire, and which in the eyes of many historians marks the end of the French Revolution. The original 18 Brumaire followed from the backwards policies of the Directory, itself a consequence of the Thermidorian Reaction. In this, it can be seen as a midway point in the reactionary march from the heights of the Revolution in 1793 to the eventual restoration of the Bourbons in 1815.

It is in this sense that Marx wrote his famous essay  Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon (“The 18th Brumaire of Louis-Napoléon”), opening with perhaps one of the most famous paragraphs in writings on history as a whole:

Hegel says somewhere that great historic facts and personages recur twice. He forgot to add: “First as tragedy, then as farce.” Caussidiere for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the “Mountain” of 1848-51 for the “Mountain” of 1793-05, the Nephew for the Uncle. The identical caricature marks also the conditions under which the second edition of the eighteenth Brumaire is issued.

For Marx was not speaking of the original 18th Brumaire, but of Napoléon’s nephew Louis-Napoléon, who pulled off a coup d’état of his own in 1851. Once again this had occurred after a revolution–the Revolutions of 1848–and Marx showed how the brief Second Republic of 1848-51 was destroyed by the bourgeoisie who treated its affairs as their own property. In this comes the prototype of most Marxist analyses of fascism (and indeed of the capitalist state as a whole), and the prediction that as capitalism advances in history, it will have a tendency to become more monolithic and less democratic. One is then confronted by the dichotomy which Rosa Luxemburg would famously express in the slogan “socialism or barbarism”.

The day 18 Brumaire will occur at least once more in the annals of world-history, and that is with Election Day in the US this year. For if one converts the date “November 8th, 2016” to the French Republican Calendar, one finds that it is “18 Brumaire, An. CCXXV”. An ominous portent indeed, especially considering the vast wealth of apocalyptic literature that has sprouted up in response to the events of the 2016 election. Both of the likely victors of this election have portrayed their opponents as not only illegitimate usurpers, but potential fascist dictators. And indeed, both can be read as descendants, ideologically, of Louis-Napoléon. For Trump it is obvious–not only is it the explicit violence he threatens against people of color, women, LGBT people (through his intensely homophobic counterpart Pence), and journalists, it is also the movement of reactionary militias that his campaign has given a new lease of life and the far-right youth who are trying to use him as a useful idiot. But Clinton is also an heir of Louis-Napoléon. Liberals love to treat her war crimes in Honduras and Haiti (among other places) as if they were mere talking points. This merely shows that they don’t care about America’s imperialist expeditions and the people whose lives they destroy and devastate; they care only for their own well-being and conditionally for people who they can use as tokens to discredit their enemies. Combined with Clinton’s earlier work to create mass incarceration in the US and her current rhetorical sabre-rattling against Russia, we see here another future of monolithic, barbaric capitalism.

Boondoggle in Seattle

If there’s one word I’d use to summarize the tenure of Mayor Murray, it’d be “disappointment”. But perhaps that’s wrong–to be disappointed by something, you’d have to expect something beforehand. And yet, despite my general lack of expectations from Mayor Murray when he came into office, he still managed to disappoint me with a consistent pattern of resisting or rejecting worthwhile (and often vitally important) projects and pushing, or at least, signing on to, boondoggle.

Now, I’d like to begin with a disclaimer: I don’t blame Mayor Murray for all of our problems. In fact, I genuinely think that he is trying to make an effort to oppose the NIMBYs who seem to have a strangle-hold on Seattle housing policy. The problems with our housing policy are the same problems most West Coast cities seem to be facing these years, and have been aggravated not by an incompetent mayor but by the indomitable political power of Seattle’s single-family, middle-to-upper-class, white neighborhoods–a political machine as strong as New York’s Tammany Hall at the height of its power, but without even the veneer of populism and concern–and their glorified megaphone, the Seattle Times.I hope that the attempt to destroy the reactionary neighborhood councils succeeds–neighborhood activism should not be for the haves but for the have-nots. I merely want to emphasize that I’m not here criticizing his attempts at challenging Seattle’s Tammany.

What I’m criticizing here is instead those many, many times where he acts as the agent for Seattle’s Tammany, refusing funds and taxation for worthwhile projects but creating similar taxation proposals for boondoggle. Let’s begin with the best-known, and one of the earlier, examples: Bertha. The issue of the Alaskan Way Viaduct replacement has a long history, but from the 2007 advisory ballot onwards, we notice a common theme: popular opposition to the building of either an elevated structure or a tunnel (with improvements to public transportation often fielded as an alternative to be funded), and hamfisted efforts by powerful interests, including Seattle’s Tammany, to push the building of a tunnel (though the state government preferred the elevated structure). Mayor McGinn, throughout his tenure, resisted the tunnel option, despite the opposition of the city council. Mayor Murray capitulated, and now it’s estimated that we’ll be spending $4.25 billion, with an estimated $223 million cost overrun to be footed by the Seattle taxpayer, who might prefer other projects, such as improvement in public transit. This is a highway tunnel, so it’s an investment in automobile usage and thus a contribution to global warming.   Let us not forget that this was never approved by the citizens of Seattle–who, after all, rejected both options for replacement of the Alaskan Way Viaduct in 2007. The construction is now three (3) years behind schedule.. The (nearly comical) news surrounding this boondoggle tunnel-boring project has somewhat unfairly soured public opinion on other tunnel projects (such as tunnels for Link Light Rail, a project whose time has come), which do not involve such massive and unreliable implements as “Bertha” and often finish ahead of time and under budget, despite the massive smear campaign against them perpetrated by Seattle’s Tammany and their conservative allies (most prominently, Tim Eyman).

Now, for residents of our fair city, the Bertha nonsense should be old news. But Mayor Murray has backed another boondoggle project as of late: a $160 million (though recently shaved to the much smaller amount of $149 million) police station for the SPD’s north precinct. The first question is of course, why does Seattle need to spend more money on its police department? Even discarding philosophical and political objections to the institution of the police, there seems to be no reason to expand it, especially as the SPD (as well as police departments across America in general) is already very well-funded. Crime rates have been dropping for the past three decades (and that’s even accepting the dubious-at-best, though widely-held, assumption that spending on police has anything to do with crime rates), and the city has many other needs which perhaps deserve more public spending. Take, for example, the shortage of housing in the face of growth (and the concomitant rise in homelessness, that even Murray claimed was an “emergency”), or the expansion of public transportation at a time when the state government is trying to kill it through cuts, or the poor educational opportunities among the youth of South Seattle and South King County as a whole. Even if you do decide that you want an extra police station, $160 million is unreasonable. It, to put it frankly, is boondoggle, nothing more, nothing less. Still, five members of the City Council have decided to rush down the massively pared down $149 million proposal, with no input by the people of Seattle.

To add to this shameless frittering of public funds towards the SPD, Murray has now shown that he is indeed willing to tax businesses–not for public transportation, nor municipal broadband, nor enforcement of labour laws, or housing, though. For those, unfortunately, Murray has said there’s no money to be had, especially not from taxes on business. But there is money, to be collected from businesses (specifically, according to The Stranger, from increases to the business and occupation tax and business licence fee), for hiring 200 new cops by 2019. Again, the necessity of this seems questionable at best, even bracketing away the issues of police brutality and white supremacy in America. As The Stranger notes, this proposal is looked upon with some approval by an institution of Seattle’s Tammany, the Chamber of Commerce.

So now we ask the following question of Mayor Murray: why do you deserve a second term? For, after all, he has announced that he is seeking re-election next year. Clearly, he has shown himself to have no understanding of the issues facing this city, nor of how to manage priorities or the public purse. Unless a sufficiently convincing reason arrives in the next year, we urge all Seattle voters to oppose Murray’s re-election

 

On the Presumably Imminent Rightward Drift of the Democratic Party Leadership

After the past two weeks of inflated press pageantry, I, personally, feel quite fed up with this current election, and thus have decided not to write about voting, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the candidates, or the moral outrage that we are all supposed to perform when we hear the name “Donald Trump”. My view on the election can be neatly summed up with this excellent piece by Fredrik DeBoer, and I resist the emotionally manipulative tactics of liberals to browbeat leftists into submission. Thus, I’d like to dedicate some time talking about a different, though related, issue which may plague the Democratic party in the future. This issue is not a new one–it has, arguably, been part of the party for at least twenty years. Perhaps calling it an issue is a bit parochial on my part, though, for it is only an issue for fellow leftists and those who sympathize with us–a better term might be “trend” or “tendency”. Specifically, I predict that in the coming years, the Democratic Party leadership will drift further to the Right, especially on economic and foreign policy issues, and suppress their left-wing with rhetoric repurposed from the more antagonistic interactions between the Old Left and New Left.

As I’ve said before, there is a good historical basis for this trend, one  with which anyone who followed the Democratic primary season this year and the rhetoric that accompanied it should be familiar. Specifically, through the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant elements of the Democratic Party, including the Clintons, abandoned even their moderate, reformist, social-democratic posture (which we may call Fabianism or Keynesianism) and accepted all the key tenets of neoliberalism.

A brief aside: Liberals claim the term “neoliberalism” is a snarl word, but this is to confuse the wideness of its applicability with a looseness of meaning. Indeed, if we understand neoliberalism as a dominant political-economical paradigm within late capitalism (one which is in some sense a revival of and extension of Victorian liberalism, or Gladstonianism as we may call it), and if we understand the rest of society as being broadly based on a political-economical infrastructure, it becomes quite clear why the term is so widely used: this paradigm appears everywhere and influences everything within our society.

If we look back at the history of the party, we can see this trend very clearly. After the 1984 landslide victory of Ronald Reagan, elements of the Democratic Party decided to acquiesce to Reaganomics and its ideological bases (economic value as the measure of all things, “dependency” and not poverty as a problem, adoption of “tough on crime” policies and posturing &c), but with a human face, called the “Third Way”, supposedly beyond left and right (not to be confused, of course, with the similar term Third Position, which refers to Nazis who also claimed to be beyond left and right). This newfound centrism, it was hoped, would win over moderate voters, which, then as now, have been largely hyped as being a huge portion of the American populace which decides elections–the Nixonian ‘silent majority’. In 1985, this coalition became a real group–the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC)–of politicians and consultants. Many of these were from the South and West, and were traditionally considered conservative Democrats–if they were in power now, they’d be called Blue Dogs. Members of the DLC in the mid-to-late-80s included the Joe Biden (then Senator from Delaware), Al Gore (then Senator from Tennessee), and Bill Clinton (then Governor of Arkansas). After the 1988 election, when Michael Dukakis lost due to an intense negative campaign by George H.W. Bush (who ironically wanted a “kinder and gentler” nation) focused on crime, the New Democrats emphasized their toughness on crime–Bill Clinton, for instance, being head of the DLC in 1990 and 1991, made a point of opportunistically executing Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally ill inmate who had saved the dessert from his last meal “for later”, during his 1992 campaign for President to show just how committed he was to the “war on crime” and the “war on drugs”. When he was elected, Clinton signed NAFTA (whose premises were that white-collar professionals were worth protecting but blue-collar proletarians were expendable), the 1994 omnibus Crime Bill (where he and his wife relied heavily on racist stereotypes and which has greatly contributed to mass incarceration, but which has been, in retrospect, shown to not have had much to do with dropping crime rates), the 1996 welfare reform act (what he later considered to be his signature piece of domestic policy, leading to the further impoverishment of many people–relying on the racist, misogynistic Reaganite myth of the welfare queen, which was not questioned but furthered, and the Reaganite premise that it was not poverty to be solved but “dependency”), and the 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall (a definite contributor to the massive fraud perpetrated by the financial industry and the subsequent collapse of the global economy).

All of this may seem to be old news, but I’d like to emphasize one element of this tale. While the New Democrats began as a strategic attempt to wrest conservative districts, senate seats, and states in the South and inland West, their complete acceptance of the premises of Reaganism spread to the North and to the West Coast. From the 1990s onwards, the South and inland West no longer elected New Democrats, but rather conservative Republicans–and the North and West Coast, who earlier were bases of support for progressives, would now find themselves confined to the Overton window defined by the New Democrats. While the New Democrats defended themselves as an attempt to destroy the misgivings the “moderate masses” would have about voting Democrat, quiet the GOP by making deals with them and incrementally push the country leftwards (witness the Democratic party rags glorifying this strategy through the all-too-gleeful quoting of Max Weber’s “slow boring of hard boards”, as if that were to be celebrated in an age of massive and imminent climate change among other disasters), they instead pushed the Democratic Party to the Right. The GOP would soon define even the conservatism of the New Democrats to be “left-wing extremism”; any short-term strategic benefits to be had from triangulation would soon vanish. The Left of the Democratic Party tried to re-assert itself at the turn of the millennium, but Clintonites were able to purge it of any influence it might have had first through the incessant pushing of an incredible misreading of the 2000 Presidential election (I don’t want to elucidate why this common view is a misreading just here–suffice it to say, it was Rehnquist’s decision not to recuse himself in  Bush v. Gore, the Butterfly Ballot, and the fact that Gore was, during the election, virtually indistinguishable from Bush–indeed, criticizing Bush for not supporting “nation building”!–not the few votes who went to Nader, as if Gore was entitled to those votes anyway) and the “unification” following 9/11.

This process is repeating itself in 2016. Many commentators have noted that the 2016 DNC reminded them quite eerily of past RNCs–anti-war activists were shouted down with chants of “USA! USA!”, for instance. The only person allowed to criticize the platform was Michael Bloomberg–from the Right, of course–because Clinton is not portraying herself as a genuine alternative to conservative Beltway politics but instead embracing the Beltway establishment and pandering to it. The neo-cons which the Democratic Party denounced in the Bush Administration are now its top foreign policy advisers. As the Intercept notes, Clinton and her Party are using the age-old Far-Right tactic of McCarthy and the John Birch Society, from where all enemies–opponents on the Right, critics on the Left–are either active agents or “useful idiots” of the Kremlin, despite Clinton herself having just as significant ties to Moscow, as if that were in itself a sin.

Now comes the part where I’m supposed to give some prescriptions to solve this problem. But unfortunately, I don’t see a way out of this. No amount of explaining that pandering to Beltway conservatives is not only cynical careerism but also ineffective as an electoral strategy (the rise of Trump on a mixture of economic anxieties and “economic anxieties” itself proves this) will change the basic modus operandi of the Democratic Party: be just mildly less bad than the Republican Party.

On Urban Revolt

Traditionally, the strategy of urban revolt had one major problem: it was all too easy for the army to surround the city and cut off its supply lines.

Following Haussmann’s 1854 renovation of Paris, which was designed in part to widen the streets such that barricades were more difficult to build, another problem developed for this strategy: namely, the rise in property speculation and property values. This led to the exodus of the industrial workers and the poor–the social base of the urban revolt–from the city center into the surrounding areas. This can be seen as parallel to the modern process of gentrification, making the city safe for capital.

However, as Walter Benjamin notes in his 12-page pitch of the Arcades Project to Adorno, this led to the creation of the red belt encircling Paris. If the red belt revolts, it could very well encircle capital in Paris, cutting off its supply lines. What was once capital’s strategy for containing and destroying urban revolt might now be used against it.